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ABSTRACT
A survey of rationing in micro theories of macroeconomics is pre-
sented. The survey starts with a closed economy with money and in~~ento-
ries, which consists of a representative household, a firm and government.
After a discussion of the notional demands and supplies arid the properties
of the Walrasian equilibrium, a discussion of the effective demands and
supplies leads to an analysis of the four regimes (Keynesian unemployment,
classical unemployment, repressed inflation and underconsumption). A fis-
cal and monetary contraction decreases sales and employment when there is
Keynesian unemployment, but is expansionary (neutral) when there is re-
pressed inflation (classical unemployment). The survey continues with an
analysis of the effects of rationing in a small open economy. It considers
the one-sector model and a model with a traded and a non-traded sector.
The latter model is used to discuss the effects of an oil discovery on the
Gulf countries and an Latin American countries. The survey ends up with a
discussion of rationing in dynamic economies, which leads to an analysis
of the effects oF expectations about future constraints on current regimes
and to a discussion of "boot-strap" equilibria.
April 1987
N The suthor is Director of the Network for Quantitative Economics. This
paper is a brief and eclectic survey of rationing models of closed one-
period and two-period economies and of small open economies. It contains
no significant new material. The author is grateful to Prof. Dr. Theo van
de Klundert for his constructive comments on an earlier version of this
survey.i
1. Introduction
With the revival of classical macroeconomics induced by the New
Classical School of Macroeconomics, market clearing has become the predo-
minant mode of analysis. Within such a framework there is no role for
fiscal or monetary policy, since the level of unemployment in the economy
will always be at its natural rate unless there are unanticipated shocks.
The Walrasian auctioneer revises prices upwards (downwards) when there is
an excess demand (supply) for a particular commodity and continues until
the Walrasian equilibrium is attained. No trading takes place until the
Walrasian equilibrium is attained. As there are no externalities or infor-
mational failures, the Walrasian equilibrium is efficient and there is no
role for government actions. The market-clearing approach to macroecono-
mics is particularly popular in the U.S. and its revival may have been
responsible for the recent laisser-faire policies adopted by most Western
governments. Since the market-clearing approach abstracts f rom involuntary
unemployment, it cannot adress the major policy issue Western countries
have been wrestling with for the last ten years. The neo-classical synthe-
sis, discussed in most textbooks, assumes informational asymmetries in the
sense that firms know aggregate prices yet workers base wage formation on
expected prices and adapt their expectations in a sluggish manner. The
neo-Keynesian synthesis gives a transient role for demand management, but
does not give a micro foundation of Keynesian unemployment. Hence, recent-
ly the fixed-price approach to macroeconomics has become, particularly in
Europe, very popular. The fixed-price or rationing approach can be viewed
as the opposite extreme of the Walrasian flex-price approach and is much
more relevant in the short run. The flex-price approach is usually associ-
ated with the Walrasian auctioneer who revises prices upwards (downwards)
when there is an excess demand for (supply of) a particular commodity.
This is not a very satisfactory approach, as no trading is assumed to take
place until the Walrasian equilibrium has been attained, and therefore the
analysis of the fix-price approach is of great practial importance.
When one recognizes the fact that prices may fail to adjust to
their Walrasian equilibrium levels, it is the adjustment of quantities
that leads to a fixed-price, rationing or temporary equilibrium. In such a
situation the actual amount transacted is determined by the "short-side"2
of the market and the "long side" gets rationed. An important feature is
that agents who are rationed in one market will recalculate their actions
in other markets. For example, Patinkin (1965) argued that, when there is
an excess supply of goods, firms' demand for labour will fall. Clower
(1g65) argues that, when there is involuntary unemployment, private demand
for goods will be lower. Clower's dual decision hypothesis generalizes the
analysis by distinguishing between the original notional and the recal-
culated effective demands and supplies. The nature of the resulting tempo-
rary equilibria depends on the values taken by the sticky prices. Natur-
elly, such quantity signals imply informational failures so that fixed-
price economies need not be efficient. The models of closed economies thst
concentrate on disequilibria in labour and product markets (e.g., Sarro
and Grossman, 1976; Malinvaud, 19~~; Muellbauer and Portes, 19~8; Bénassy,
1980) result in four possible regimes: Keynesian unemployment, classical
unemployment, repressed inflation and underconsumption. To obtain the
second and fourth regime it is important to allow for the buffer stock
role of both money balances and inventories. The first regime provides a
micro foundation of Keynes' concept of involuntary unemployment. Obvious-
ly, the appropriate nature of the policy actions of the government depend
crucially on the nature of the prevailing regime. Barro and Grossman
(19~6) also extend the basic model by allowing for markets in fixed in-
vestment and financial assets other than money. Some refer to this ap-
proach to macroeconomics as the disequilibrium approach, but we prefer to
refer to it as the rationing approach as all agents are on their effective
demand and supply schedules, all trade is voluntary and therefore the
economy is in (temporary) equilibrium. Most of these macroeconomic models
with rationing imply that there cannot be both rationed sellers and ra-
tioned buyers, which is inconsistent with the presence of both unfilled
vacancies and unemployment. To relax this undesirable feature, one needs
to ellow for s variety of local labour markets (e.g., Muellbauer, 1978;
Kooiman, 1984). Honkapohja (19~9) and Malinvaud (1980) extend rationing
models of closed economies with wage and price dynamics.
A closed economy may be relevant for the world as a whole or for
the U.S., but most countries resemble a small open economy much more
closely. Dixit (1978) discusses a small open economy with one sector. Zn
such a context rationing of the goods market is impossible, because excess3
demand (or supply) for home goods can be met by imports from (exports to)
the rest of the world, and therefore only the labour market can be in
disequilibrium. Neary (1980) extends the analysis to allow for a small
open economy with a traded ("exposed") and a non-traded goods ("shel-
tered") sector, i.e., for the dependent economy model of Salter (1959).
Despite the fact that there are no inventories and the demand for or
supply of traded goods can never be rationed, the four regimes of the
Barro-Grossman-Malinvaud analysis reappear. For example, underconsumption
corresponds to an excess supply of non-traded goods and an excess demand
for labour. Van Wijnbergen (1984) applies the dependent economy oodel to
analyse the effects of an oil bonanza. The Gulf countries have a rela-
tively high share of imported goods in their consumption basket and are
therefore more likely to end up in a regime of regressed inflation. On the
other hand, the Latin American oil producers have (due to various import
barriers) a relatively low share of imported goods and are therefore more
likely to end up in a regime of classical unemployment. This latter pos-
sibility is referred to as the "Dutch Disease". Van Wijnbergen (1985)
considers the intertemporal disequilibrium effects of an oil bonanza and
Neary and van Wijnbergen (1986) give a general survey of the "Dutch
Disease". More extended surveys of rationing in open economies are
Cuddington, Johansson and Lofgren (1984) and Neary (1986). Examples of
two-country rationing models are presented in Owen (1985) and Rankín
(1987b).
Another interesting extension of the Harro-Grossnan-Malinvaud
analysis is to consider dynamic, closed economies. Neary and Stiglitz
(1983) use a two-period rationing model of a closed economy to analyse the
effects of expectations about future constraints on current regimes. They
find that this leads to "boot-strap" equilibria, that is households'
(firms') expectations of future constraints on their ability to sell
labour (goods) make it more likely that they face a sales constraint in
the current period. They also consider ratíonal constraint expectations
and show that, when Keynesian unemployment prevails in the current period,
the employment multiplier of government spending is greater with rational
than with static expectations of Keynesian unemployment (and greater still
than with Walrasian expectations). This is an important result, because it
shows that the policy neutrality propositions of the New Classical School4
of Macroeconomics (e.g. Sargent and Wallace, 1975) rely crucially on their
essumption that prices and wages move instanteneously to clear sll goods
and labour markets and do not rely on their assumption of rational expec-
tations. These policy neutrality propositions must therefore be treated as
e theoretical curiosum. Blanchard and Sachs ( 1982) formulate a continuous-
time rationing model of a closed economy with infinitely-lived agents and
capital accumulation and use a"multiple shooting" algorithm, for the
dynamic simulation of perfect-foresight models, to consider the effects of
unanticipated and anticipated policies. Van de Klundert and Peters (1986)
extend their analysis to answer questions about tax incidence in the
various regimes.
Section 2 surveys the effects of rationing in a closed economy and
discusses the effects of fiscal and monetary policy. Section 3 discusses
rationing in small open economies ( with one sector and with two sectors)
and analyses the effects of an oil bonanza on the dependent economy. Sec-
tion 4 considers the effects of constraint expectations in an intertempo-
ral model. Section 5 concludes the survey.5
2. RationinR and macroeconomic theorylr
2.1. Notional demands and supplies
We assume thst there is a representative household, who consumes
goods, leisure and real money balances, a representative firm, who demands
labour and supplies goods, and a government, which demands goods and
prints money to finance these goods. Agents cannot influence wages or
prices. The asset menu consists of only money, so that there are no
interest-bearing assets. The notional demands and supplies are those de-
mands and supplies which prevail when agents are not rationed, that is
when households can buy all the goods they wish and sell as much labour as
they wish and when firms can hire as much labour as they want and sell as
much goods as they want. The government is assumed never to be rationed ir~
its demand for goods. The notional demands and supplies will be indicated
by superscripts d and s, respectively. Let us first consider the notional
demands and supplies of households.
The households choose consumption (c), their supply of labour (,C),
and their holdings of real money balances (m) to maximize their utility,
U(c,.~,m), subject to the household budget constraint (HBC), m-m~ - rt0 .
w.~ - c where m0 and rt0 denote initial holdings of real money balances and
real profits are assumed to be distributed at the end of the previous
period and w denotes the real wage. The maximum labour supply is unity.
Since money is the only asset, savings lead to an increase in real money
balances. Utility is an increasing function of consumption, leisure (1-.l)
and real money balances, and is concave in its arguments. Feenstra (1986)
provides some justification, based on the transaction cost approach, for
including real money balances in the utility function. It could be viewed
as a proxy for future consumption possibilities (Dixit and Norman, 1980)
and gives a simple theory of the demand for money. Bénassy (1982) gives en
alternative justification function for putting money in the utility func-
1) Sections 2.1-2.5 are based on a lecture hand-out for the Master's
course in Macroeconomics of the London School of Economics originally
developed by Willem Buiter. The author is grateful to the course
organised, Charles Bean, for permission to use some of this material.6
tion. The first-order conditions2) are: (i) the marginal rate of substi-
tution between consumption and leisure should equal the real wage, -
U~~Um - w; (ii) the marginal utility of consumption should equal the
marginal utility of real money balances, Uc - Um; and (iii) the HBC. We
will assume that goods, leisure and real money balances are normal goods.
A sufficient condition for this is that the utility function is weakly
separable, say U(.) - ocl log(c) f aZ log(1-.i) . a3 log(m), ci t 0, al 4
a2 a a3 - 1. It fO110W5 ti18t:3)
; 4
cd - Cd(w, m~4no~w) - al(m~tn~fw)
. -
~s - Ls(w, mUinC.w) - 1 - a2(mCtno;w)~w
~ ,




where the explicit solutions are given for the case of Cobb-Douglas prefe-
rences. The question marks in (1) and (3) arise from the ambiguity due to
the income effect and the substitution effect. When "income", that is
initial holdings of real money balances, profits and full-employment wage
income, increases, savings and consumption of goods and leisure increase.
An increase in the real wage also increases the opportunity cost of
leisure, so that the net effect of the real wage on leisure and the supply
of labour is ambiguous. For Cobb-Douglas preferences, the substitution
effect dominates.
Now consider the notional decisions of firms. Since we want to
allow for the regime of underconsumption (excess demand for labour and
excess supply of goods), we allow for a simple theory of inventory hold-
ings (e.g., Muellbauer and Portes, 1978). Hence, firms choose their demand
2) T'he signs of the partial derivatives are given above the expressions.
3) The signs of the partial derivatives are given above the expressions.for labour and their holdings of inventories (i) to maximize rt. V(f(,C)-
sti~) where s denotes sales of output and i~ denotes the stock of invento-
ries at the end of the previous period. Profits are defined as n- s-w.~.
The production function is f(~) and satisfies f'(.L) ) 0 and f"(~) C 0.
Due to the uncertainty firms face about price and wage outcomes (and pos-
sibly about ration levels and constraint regimes), firms attach a value to
inventories at the end of the current period (i), V(i) where i~ f(~) -
s i ip. This value function satisfies V'(i) ) 0 and V"(i) C 0. The first-
order conditions are that the marginal value of inventories is unity,
V'(i) - 1, and that the marginal product of labour equals the real wage,
hence





- i~ t f(Ld(w)) - Ss(w.i~). Si - f'~f " C 0. S2 - 1. (5)
Since the marginal productivity of labour diminishes, one obtains a stan-
dard downward-sloping labour-demand schedule. The specisl case of no in-
ventories yields ss - f(Ld(w)) - Ss(w).
The government budget constraint (GBC) follows from the HBC and
GME and is given by (m-m~) ~(ntrt~) - g. Hence, the net acquisition of
financial assets by the private sector (households and firms) equals total
money creation and must match the government deficit.
2.2. Walrasian equilibrium
Before we discuss disequilibrium in product and labour markets, a
brief discussion of Walrasian equilibrium (WE) will be useful. In WE the
adjustment of prices and wages ensures that all markets clear and there-
fore all agents are on their notional demand and supply curves. The labour
market clears when Ls(w, m~tn~tw) - Ld(w) holds and the goods market
4 ~! 4
clears when Ss(w,i~) - Cd(w, m~~rt~tw) ~ g holds, where g denotes the level
of real government spending. Since m0 E M~~P where MQ is the given stock8
of nominal money balances at the end of the previous period and P is the
nominal price level, labour market equilibrium (LME) and goods market
equilibrium (GME) give two loci in w-P space. For the case of Cobb-Douglas
preferences, the LME locus slopes downwards, since a high real wage in-
duces an incipient excess supply of labour which is choked off by a low
price level as this boosts real "income" and the demand for leisure, and
the GME locus slopes upwards, since a low real wage induces an excess
supply of goods which needs to be choked off by a low price level as this
boosts real non-wage "income" and thus the demand for goods. The intersec-
tion of the two loci gives the WE (see Figure 1).
An increase in government spending leads to an incipient excess
demand for goods, which is choked off by a reduction in real "income" and
consumption induced by an increase in the price level. This leads to an
incipient excess supply of labour, which is choked off by a fall in the
real wage. The net effect is an increase in employment. The WE shifts from
W to W'.
An increase in fiat money (M~) also shifts out the LME locus, so
that the price level increases and the real wage either falls or in-
creases. The reason is that the associated increase in wealth cuts labour
supply and therefore the real wage has to rise in order to restore LME.
Hence, the effect on employment is ambiguous.
2.3. Effective demands and supplies
Effective demands and supplies are relevant when agents are ra-
tioned, which may occur when wages and prices are fixed, and are contin-
gent on rations in all other markets (Bénassy, 1975).
When households are constrained on the labour market, ~s ).Cd, the
effective labour supply is given by the demand for labour, ~- .Cd, and
effective demand for goods (cd) follows from the fact that the marginal
rate of substitution between goods and real money balances evaluated at9
the rationed level of labour supply, is unity, Uc(cd, .~, mU~nU.w.i-c~) -
Um(cd, .i, m~tn~~w.C-cd) and therefore4)
(t) ?
c- ~d(mU t nQtw.l, ~) - al(mUtnO~w.~)~(1-a2). (6)
The spill-over effect of disequilibrium in the labour market on the demand
for goods means that households cannot work as much as they wish and
therefore their effective demand for goods is less. When households are
constrained on the goods market, cd ) cs ~ ss - g, the effective demand
for goods is constrained by the supply of goods, c- cs, and the effective
supply of labour (.~s) follows from the fact that the marginal rate of
substitution between real money balances and leisure, evaluated at the
rationed level of the demand for goods, should equal the real wage,
U~(c, ~, mUtnU{w~i-c) --w Um(c, ,~, mU~nC.w.~-c) and therefore
~s (-) ? (t)
- Ls(m~ t n-c. c. w)- Ca3 - a2(m~4n~-c)IwU(1-al). (7)
The spill-over effect of disequilibrium in the product market on the
supply of labour implies that, when households cannot purchase all the
goods they wish, their effective supply of labour is less. When households
are constrained on both markets, cd ) cs and ~s )~Cd, the rule of the
short side of the market says that the effective quantities are given by
c- ss - g and ~C -~id .
When firms are constrained on the labour market, ~d ),Cs, they
cannot get hold of enough workers and therefore ~-~Cs and their effective
supply of goods (ss) is less. The effective supply of goods follows from
V'(f(i)tiU-ss) - 1, so that
-------------------------------------------------------
4) It is easily shown that
m'(Umm-Ucm)I(Ucc-2Ucm;Umm) and ~- (Um.L-
Uc~i)I(Ucc-2Ucm{Umm)' Hence, for separable (e.g., Cobb-Douglas) preferen-
ces, ID) 0. In general ~~ 0 and, if goods and money balances are coope-
rant commodities, m ) 0.10
ss - Ss(i0. ~). Si - 1, S2 - f'(~C). (8)
For the special case of no inventories, ' ss - f(~C). When firms are con-
strained on the goods market due to a lack of effective demand, cd 4 g C
ss, the supply of goods is rationed, s- cd . g, and therefore the effec-
tive demand for labour (~d) is less. ~d follows from V'(f(~Cd).10-
s)f'(~d) - w, so that
a -
.id - Ld(s-i0. w). La - {f'[1 . (V'f"~V"(f")2)]}-1 ~
l~f'. (9)
For the speciel case of no inventories, the demand for labour is deter-
mined by the effective demand for goods, ~d - f-1(s). When firms are con-
strained on both markets, ~d ~~s and sd C ss, the effective quantities
are .~ -.~s and s- sd ~ cd . g.
2.4. The four regimes
It is clear that rationing implies that the GME and LME loci of
Figure 1 are no longer valíd, since disequilibrium in one market spills
over into another market. Goods market equilibrium with an excess supply
of labour (XSL) is given by
- , (,) ~
Ss(w. i0) - ~(m0 'RO~wLd(w). LdÍw)) ' g. (10)
The associated GME:XSL locus is steeper than the GME locus, because unem-
ployment means that households have less income and consume less and con-
sequently one needs lower prices ("Keynes" effect) to boost demand or
higher real wages to attenuate supply. Goods market equilibrium when there
is an excess demand for labour (XDL) is given by
. a . - ~ a
Ss(i0. Lsíw. m0{n0;w)) - Cd(w, m0.rt0.w) . g.
Since firms are rationed in their demand for labour, they supply less
goods and therefore the price level has to rise and thus erode wealth and
reduce consumption demand and increase the supply of labour or the real11
wage has to fall in order to restore GME. It follows that the CME:XDL
locus is steeper than the GME locus.
Labour market equilibrium with an excess supply of goods (XSG) is
given by
. - t ? t -
Ls(w. m04nOtw) - Ld(Cd(w. m0;rt0{w) 4 g- i0. w). (12)
Since firms are rationed in their sales of goods, their demand for labour
falls and therefore the real wage must fall in order to restore LME.
Hence, the LME:XSG locus is steeper than the LME locus. Labour market
equilibrium with an excess demand for goods is given by
(-)
Ls(m0 ; n0-Ss(w, i0)
~ (.)
{ g. Ss(w. i0)-g. w )- Ld(w). (13)
Now households cannot buy as many goods as they wish, so that labour
supply falls and therefore the real wage has to rise in order to choke of
the demand for labour and restore LME. Hence, the LME:XDG locus is steeper
than the LME locus.
We are now ready to partion the w-P space in to four regimes:
CLASSICAL UNEMPLOYMENT (CU) - XDG, XSL;
KEYNESIAN UNEMPLOYMENT (KU) - XSG, XSL;
REPRESSED INFLATION (RI) - XDG, XDL;
UNDERCONSUMPTION (UC) - XSG, XDL.
When there is no possibility of inventory holdings (e.g. Barro and
Grossman, 1976; Malinvaud, 197~), the LME:XSG and GME:XDL loci coincide
and the underconsumption regime disappears. The reason is that a lack of
effective demand for goods and an excess demand for labour are impossible
when there are no inventories. Similarly, the regime of classical unem-
ployment disappears when there is no money or other store of value.
2.5. Effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy in each of the regimes
In the regime of classical unemployment households are rationed in
both markets, so that s- Ss(w, i0) and ~- Ld(w). Hence, neither fiscal
nor monetary policy has real effects.12
In the regime of Keynesian unemployment there is generalized ex-
(f) ?
cess supply, so that GME is given by s- C(mD { nDtw~, .~) . g and LME is
. -
given by .~ - Ld(s-ip, w). Solving for s and ~ yields:
ds 1 1 C ~C~-LZ (wC . C2 ) dg
dm (14)
- ~ d d~d d-d d 0
d~ KU L1 L1G1 ~L1 G1 ~ L2 dw
where o E 1- La(wCiC2) ~ 05). It follows that an increase in real gov-
ernment spending, an increase in the nominal money supply and a fall in
the price level increase aggregate demand and therefore increase sales and
employment. An increase in the real wage increases real income and there-
fore increases consumption, sales and employment. However, it also in-
creases the cost of labour and therefore cuts employment. The net effect
of the real wage on employffient in the KU regime is therefore ambiguous.
However, in principle it is possible that the real wage moves pro-cycli-
cally.
In the regime of repressed inflation there is generalized excess
t . (-)
demand, so that GME is given by s- Ss(iG, ~) and LME by ~i - Ls(mD { nD- ~ (4) ..,
stg, s-g, w ). It follows that
ds 1 S2(Li-LZ) LiS2 S2L3 dg
l d~C, - o Ls - Ls Ls Ls ~0 RI ~1 ~2 ~1 --3 dw
(15)
where o' ~ 1-'S2(L2-Li) is assumed to be positive. An increase in real
government spending worsens the rationing of the demand for goods of pri-
vate agents, hence there is less incentive for households to supply labour
and consequer:tly firms supply even less goods. The expression for
(ds~dg)RZ ~ D is called the supply multiplier (Barro and Grossman, 1976).
5) Note that with XSL and XSG wCf'(1~La must hold, so that wLaC
( C( 1
and (definitely for the case of separable preferences) o~ 0. The condi-
tion that ~~ 0 is analogous to the Keynesian condition that the "marginal
propensity to consume" is less then unity.13
An increase in the nominal money supply, M0, or a fall in the price level
increases real income and therefore reduces the supply of labour and con-
sequently reduces the sales of goods. An increase in the real wage reduces
the demand for leisure, so that the supply of labour and therefore sales
increase. Repressed inflation is particularly relevant in the Eastern
European economies.
Finally, in the regime of underconsumption firms are rationed in
their sales of goods and in their purchases of labour, so that GME is
? r ~ -
given by s- Cd(w, mOtnOtw) t g and LME by ,i - Ls(w, mOtnOtw). It follows
that an increase in government spending increases sales one-for-one, i.e.
there are no "multiplier" effects, and does not affect employment. An
increase in real money balances increases real income and therefore in-
creases sales and reduces the labour supply, (ds~dm0)UC - C2 ~ 0 and
s
(d~,~0)UC - L2 ( 0. M increase in the real wage increases real income
and therefore increases sales and cuts the supply of labo~ir. However, it
also increases the opportunity cost of leisure and therefore increases
employment. The net effect on employment is ambiguous, but for Cobb-
Douglas preferences it is positive (see expression (2)).
2.6. Wage and price dynamics
So far, the analysis assumed fixed wages and prices. It is inte-
resting to ask the question how wages and prices adjust towards the Walra-
sian equilibrium over time (e.g., Honkapohja, 19~9; Malinvaud, 1980). One
possibility is to assume that real wages rise (decline) when there is an
excessive effective demand for (supply of) labour (i.e., "real wage rigi-
dity") and that prices rise (fall) when there is an excess effective de-
mand for (supply of) goods. In a KU or UC regime there is XSG, so that w~
w~w - X(~Ld-.Cs), but in a CU- or RI-regime there is XDG and therefore w- L ~ X(~d-~s)
with aL ) 0. In a CU- or KU-regime there is XSL and P~ P~P -
--d' s ~G(c tg-s ), but in a RI- or UC-regime there is XDG and therefore P-
d ~s
XG(c ~g-s ) with XG ) 0. The associated phase-arrows are given in Figure
2 and demonstrate that the real wage-price adjustment is a convergent (mo-
notonic or cyclical) process. If the initial position is one of Keynesian
unemployment, both real wages and prices fall. The fall in real wages
chokes off the excess supply of labour and the effective supply oF goods.14
The fall in prices boosts real money balances and wealth, which increases
the effective demand for goods and labour and cuts the supply of labour.
This process eventu811y aoves the economy in to a regime of underconsump-
tion, where the real wage starts rising and thus increasing the demand for
goods and choking off the excess demand for labour. The falling prices
slso tend to create an excess demand for goods, so that eventually the
econoay moves in to a regime of repressed inflation. The cyclical adjust-
ment carries on until the Walrasian equilibrium is reached. A formal proof
is complicated by the fact that the Jacobian of the two-dimensional dyna-
mic system is not continuous, so that the simple local stability condition
of a negative trace and a positive determinant cannot be applied. Instead,
one has to use more sophisticated mathematical techniques (e.g., Ito,
1979; van den Heuvel, 1983; Honkapohja and Ito, 1983). In certain cases,
it is even possible to have cycles between the regimes (Blad and Zeeman,
1982) or catastrophe (Madden, 1982).
One could argue that nominal wage rigidity is more realistic than
real wage rigidity and that downward stickyness of the nominal wage is
important. In that case, it is not difficult to see that Keynesian unem-
ployment is likely to last rather longer than classical unemployment
(e.g., Malinvaud, 1980).
One of the problems with studies of the dynamic adjustment of
wages and prices sofar is that they ignore the dynamics of inventories
(e.g., Honkapohje and Ito, 1980), savings and expectations about future
constraints (see Section 4) and that they ignore the intertemporal govern-
ment budget constraint (e.g., Rankin, 1987a for a closed economy; and van
Wijnbergen, 1986 for a small open economy). Future studies of rationing in
closed economies should consider the interactions between wage-price dyna-
mics, wealth dynamics, expectational dynamics, and the dynamics of the
government budget constraint. Such consideration might also lead to an
analysis of stochastic quantity rationing (e.g., Honkapohja and Ito, 1985;
Gerard-Varet, Jordan and Kirman, 1986).15
3. Rationing in small open economies
3.1. A one-sector model
For policy purposes it is important to consider the implications
of rationing for a small open economy. Dixit (1978) discusses the effects
of rationing in a one-sector model of a small open economy with no inven-
tories, immobile labour, tradeable goods, prices determined on the world
~ w
market (purchasing power parity, P- P E where P is the world price level
and E is the nominal exchange rate), and fixed exchange rates. In fact,
rationing is such an open economy is much simpler than in a closed econ-
omy. Any effective excess demand for or supply of goods is ~et by import-
íng goods from or exporting goods to the rest of the world. Hence, there
can never be any spill-over effects from the goods market on to the labour
market and thus whether unemployment or overemployment prevails depends
entirely on whether the real wage is too high or too low.
The balance of trade (net exports, b) follows from the absorption
approach, that is the excess of production over absorptions. When there is
an excess supply of labour, it is given by
b ~ f(Ld{w)) - C(mD{nD.w Ld(w), Ld(w)) - B,
and when firms are rationed, it is given by
s d b` f(1- (w, m~tn~fw)) - C(w, m~.n0.w) - g.
(16)
(16')
We assume that there is real wage rigidity, so that w is fixed in the
short run irrespective of whether exchange rates float or are pegged.
Figure 3 presents the four possible outcomes and has some simila-
rities with the familiar Mundell-Swan diagram. In the short run the econ-
omy may experience a trade surplus (or deficit), but in the long run this
leads in the absence of sterilisation to an increase (decrease) in foreign
reserves, the money supply and wealth, and thus to a downward (upward)
shift of the effective GME locus and an upward (downward) shift of the LME
locus. A trade surplus leads to more wealth, which when there is unemploy-
ment increases the effective demand of households for goods and thus16
chokes off some of the trade surplus. When firms are rationed, the in-
crease in wealth reduces the supply of labour and thus of goods, increases
the demand for goods, and thus chokes off the trade surplus in two ways.
However, in the latter case the initisl excess demand for labour is wor-
sened. These adjustment processes are of course related to David Hume's
specie-flow mechanism and the monetary approach to the balance of pay-
ments.
The adjustment process under floating exchange rates is quite
different. When there is an incipient trade surplus, the nominal exchange
appreciates, the home price level falls and thus real wealth is boosted.
This chokes off the excess supply of goods, so that the economy never
diverges from the effective GME locus and balanced trade.
A fiscal expansion in an economy with fixed exchange rates shifts
the Walrasian equilibríum from W to W', so that on impact the trade defi-
cit rises by exactly the same amount as the increase in government spend-
ing (cf., the New Cambridge School). As the budget deficit must be finan-
ced by money creation, next period's stock of real money balances in-
creases by the change in government spending. However, this increase is
exactly off-set by the decrease due to the ensuing trade deficit and thus
there is no change in the short-run equilibrium over time. Effectively,
the government uses its foreign reserves to purchase commodities from
abroad as can be seen from the identity
(m-m0) t (n-n~) - B 4 b. (17)
i.e., the net acquisition of financial assets by the private sector must
equal the sum of the government dificit and the trade surplus.
With floating exchange rates and real wage rigidity the new Walra-
sian equilibrium lies to the north-east of W', say W", so that the fiscal
expansion leads to unemployment. The reason for this (counter-intuitive)
result is that the depreciation of the exchange rate, required to choke
off the incipient trade deficit, increases the home price level, erodes
real wealth and increases the supply of labour (whilst the real wage and
thus labour demand are unaffected).
Note that a devaluation in a situation of unemployment erodes the
real value of wealth and therefore reduces the demand for goods and cases17
a trade surplus. (If there is nominal rather than real wage rigidity,
labour demand and output increase.) A devaluation in a situation of excess
demand for labour reduces labour supply and output, decreases demand and
improves the trade balance.
Static two-country models with imperfect substitution between home
and foreign goods are analyzed in Lorie and Sheen (1982), Laussell and
Montet (1983), and Owen (~985), whilst dynamic two-country models with a
single homogeneous internationally traded good (i.e., with purchasing
power parity) are analyzed in Persson (1982) and in Rankin (~987b}. Pur-
chasing power parity is not a very realistic assusption. A static model is
not very realistic either, because a satisfactory description of floating
exchange rates requires a dynamic model of the capital account and the
demand for bonds as well as for money. Hence, future work will analyze
dynamic two-country models of rationíng with differentiated products.
3.2. A two-sector model: Traded and non-traded goods
The two-sector model developed by Neary (1980) extends Dixit
(1978) by allowing for a non-traded good whose price is rigid in the short
run. Zt basically introduces rationing of the non-traded goods and labour
markets into Salter's (1959) well-known model of the dependent economy.
The dependent economy model has a fixed exchange rate (E) and produces a
twaded good (sT), which is a perfect substitute for the foreign good (PT -
P E where PT denotes the home price of the traded good), and a non-traded
good (sN) with price PN. Labour is mobile between the two sectors, but not
internationally. Production in each of the two sectors obeys neoclassical
production functions, si - fi(.~i), i- N,T where ~i is employment in sec-
tor i. Maximization of profits under perfect competition in each sector
yields the notional labour demand functions ~Ca - La(wi), i- N,T, where
wN ~ W~PN is the real wage faced by producers of non-traded goods, wT ~
W~PT - wN~e is the real wage faced by producers of traded goods, W is the
nominal wage, and e ~ PT~PN is the real exchange rate. For simplicity, we
assume that the supply of labour is inelastic (~s - Z). In that case,
labour market equilibrium yields
Z - LNÍwN) ~ La(wN~e) (18)18
so that
wN - WN(e). WN - wT~Ll 4(e fT'~fN')] ) 0. (18')
The LME locus (see Figure 4) slopes upwards, because an increase in the
relative price of traded goods (e) induces a shift along the production
possibility frontier and therefore resources (i.e., labour) are moved from
the non-traded to the traded goods sector. Households maximize their uti-
lity, U(cT, cN, m) where ci is consumption of good i and m ~ M~PN denotes
real money balances, subject to their budget constraint, e cT 4 cN t m-
n0 t wN~ ` m0. The notional demand functions are:
- .
cT - CTIe. m0~n0~w~) - P1(mOtnO;wN~)Ie
? ,
cN - CN(e. m0~n0.wNZ) - P2(m0~n0~wN"" )
~ t




where the explicit solutions are given for the case of Cobb-Douglas prefe-
rences. U(.) - ál log(cT) a~2 loB(cN) ~~3 loB(m). ~i 2 0, pl 3 R2 t~ -
3
1. Zt follows that equilibrium in the market for non-traded goods (NTGME)
is given by
fN(LN(wN)) - CN(e. mOtnO.wN.I) . BN. (22)
where gN is real government spending on non-traded goods. If non-traded
goods are a gross substitute (CN.e ) 0), an appreciation of the real ex-
change rate increases the demand for non-traded goods which needs to be
choked off by a fall in the real wage as this increases supply, and re-
duces income and demand. Hence, the NTGME locus slopes downwards when non-
traded goods are a gross substitute. The Walrasian equilibrium, W, is at
the intersection of the notional LME and NTGME loci. The two loci divide
the space into four zones of economic misery. An increase in government
spending on non-traded goods exerts an upward pressure on the relative
price of non-traded goods. This increases the wage faced by producers of19
traded goods and reduces the demand for labour in the traded sector; the
incipient excess supply oF labour is choked off by a fall in the real wage
faced by producers of non-traded goods and an increase in employment in
the non-traded sector. The decrease in the supply of traded goods (s,I,) and
the increase in the demand for traded goods (cT) induces a trade deficit
as can be seen from:
.
(23) b~ fT(LT(wN~e)) - CT(e, mG;rtG.w~) - g,r
where g,i, is government spending on traded goods. The TGME locus is the
locus of balanced trade; below (above) it there is a trade deficit (sur-
plus). It slopes upwards because an increase in the relative price of
traded goods leads to an excess supply of traded goods that needs to be
choked off by an increase in the wage facing producers of non-traded
goods. tJnder floating exchange rates this deficit is choked off by a de-
preciation of the nominal exchange rate (fall in e), but under fixed ex-
change rates the adjustment occurs via changes in the level of foreign
reserves, money and wealth.
So far, we have considered the notional demands and supplies and
the Walrasian equilibrium. However, when prices and wages are not
flexible, they may not be at their Walrasian levels and therefore there
will be at least one type of agent that is constrained in the non-traded
goods market and one type of agent that is constrained in the labour mar-
ket.
When there is involuntary unemployment, the effective demand for
non-traded goods is lower and thus its relative price must fall to ensure
equilibrium in the market for non-traded goods (NTGME). Hence, the
NTGME:XSL locus,
fN(LN(wN)) - N(e. mGtnG4wN[LN(wN) ; I.a(wN~e)~) t 6H~ (24)
lies to the right of the NTGME locus (see Figure 5). When there is excess
demand for labour, firms in either the traded or in the non-traded sector
or in both sectors are rationed. If firms in the traded sector get
priority in the allocation of labour, the NTGME:XDL locus is given by20
fN(z-LT(wNle)) - CN(e, mO;nOtwNz) , gN, (25)
Since the supply of non-traded goods is rationed, the relative price of
non-traded goods must rise and therefore the associated NTGME:XDL~ locus
lies below the NTGME locus. If firms in the non-traded sector get priority
~.
in the allocation of labour, the associated NTGME:XDL coincides with the
NTGME locus. When there is an excess demand for non-traded goods (XDNT),
firms in the non-traded sector are not rationed and therefore the LME:XDNT
locus coincides with the LME locus. When there is an excess supply of non-
traded goods (XSNT), firms in the non-traded sector are rationed by the
demand for their products so that the LME:XSNT locus is given by
z- 1-T(wN~e) t fNl(CN(e. mOtrtO.w~) . B). (25')
Note that the LME:XSNT locus is identical to the NTGME:XDL locus. Figure 5
portrays the four possible regimes familiar from the analysis of the
closed economy (see Section 2). Classical unemployment (CU) prevails when
there is XSL and XDNT, Keynesian unemployment (KU) when there is XSL and
XSNT, and repressed inflation (RI) when there is XDL and XDNT, and under-
consumption (UC) when there is XDL and XSNT. The underconsumption regime
is degenerate when firms in the traded sector get priority in the alloca-
tion of labour. However, when firms in the non-traded sector have prio-
rity, double rationing of firms and therefore underconsumption is a possi-
bility. This possibility is not due to inventories (as in Section 2) but
arises because firms producing traded goods are rationed in their demand
for labour whilst firms producing non-traded goods are rationed in their
sales of goods.
More details on the duality approach to rationing models of open
economies may be found in Dixit and Norman (1980). Gunning (1983) and
Kennally (1983) also discuss interesting models of rationing in open eco-
nomies. Excellent surveys of disequilibrium macroeconomics in open eco-
nomies are Cuddington, Johansson and Lofgren (1984) and Neary (1986).21
3.3. The effects of an oil bonanza
To illustrate the dependent economy model, it is probably best to
discuss a policy application. One of the more interesting ones is the
problem of the "Dutch Disease". This occurs when a small open economy
discovers natural resources, say oil (or natural gas), and consequently
experiences an oil bonanza. It is assumed that no use is made of capital
or labour in the production of oil,so that it is similar to the shock that
occurs when a small open economy receives a transfer of foreign aid. The
result is an increase in private wealth, which in a Walrasian world shifts
the equilibrium from W to W' (see Figure 4). The oil bonanza leads to an
increase in income, so that the demand for non-traded goods rises. To
choke off this extra demand, the relative price of non-traded goods in-
creases, i.e., the real exchange rate appreciates, and therefore resources
more from the traded sector to the non-traded goods sector. This is accom-
panied by a fall in the real wage prevalent in the non-traded goods sector
and, due to the appreciation of the real exchange rate, an increase in the
real wage of the traded goods sector, wT - wN~e. The decline in employment
and output of the traded sector is called the "Dutch Disease". Obviously,
there is a worsening of the non-oil trade balance as the supply of traded
goods has fallen and the demand for traded goods has increased. This de-
cline of the traded goods sector is not necessarily a reason for policy
intervention, since the oil bonanza does not decrease welfare in a Walra-
sian world.
However, a proper explanation of the "Dutch Disease" requires a
disequilibrium analysis (van Wijnbergen, 1984; 1985; Neary and van Wijn-
bergen, 1986). An explanation is needed of why oil-producing countries
such as Egypt, Mexico, United Kingdom snd the Netherlands experience prob-
lems of unemployment whilst the Gulf countries experience bottlenecks and
labour shortages. The reason that the Gulf countries are more líkely to
slide in to a regime of repressed inflation is that their consumers' price
index has a large traded-goods component, so that a rise in the real wage
of the sector producing traded goods (wT - wN~e) allows a large drop in
the real wage of the sector producing non-traded goods (wN) and therefore
workers fired in the traded goods sector can more easily be absorbed in to
the non-traded goods sector (van Wijnbergen, 1984). For the case thatzz
firms in the traded goods sector get priority in the allocation of labour,
the effects of an oil bonanza are presented in Figure 5.
The oil bonanza does not affect the LME:XDNT locus, but shifts
down the LME:XSNT locus. The NTGME loci shift down as the additional de-
mand for non-traded goods must be choked off by an increase in the rela-
tive price of non-traded goods (i.e., by a real appreciation of the ex-
change rate). The Walrasian equilibrium consequently shifts from W to W'.
It follows that at the pre-bonanza equilibrium, W, there will now be an
excess demand for non-traded goods and labour market equilibrium. Where
the economy will move to from there depends on the wage-price adjustment
one assumes. Van Wijnbergen (1984) assumes that the relative price of non-
traded goods rises when there is an excess demand for non-traded goods,
PN - PT --ê - aN{cN ~ gN - fN(.~N)J
, XN 2 0, (26)
and that the real consumers' wage declines when there is unemployment,
W-(i-w)PN - wPT - XL(~Tt~N-z). XL z 0 (27)
where 0 s y 5 1 denotes the share of traded goods in the basket of con-
sumers' goods. The wage adjustment implies that there is full indexation
to increases in the cost of láving. At the pre-bonanza equilibrium, there
is LME and XDNT and consequently the real wage in the non-traded goods
sector is decreasing, due to indexation to falling relative prices of
traded goods (wN - yê --y~aNXDNT C 0), and the real wage in the traded
goods sector is increasing ( wT - wN-ê - (1-w)a~CDNT ) 0). Since wN -
-y(1-y)-1wT ~ 0, one sees that, when the share of traded goods in the
consumers' basket, W , is high, a rise in wT allows a large drop in wN.
This means that workers sacked in the traded goods sector can be more
easily taken on by the non-traded goods sector, so that excess demand for
labour and repressed inflation is more likely to occur ( as in the move
from W to R in Figure 5). Since the Gulf countries have a large share of
traded goods in their consumers' basket, they are more likely to end up
with repressed inflation and therefore to import labour from abroad. Coun-
tries such as Egypt, Mexico and Indonesia have, due to various import
barriers, a low share of traded goods and therefore they are more likely23
to end up in a regime of classical unemployment (as in the move from W to
C in Figure 5). If the traded and non-traded goods sectors employ the same
CFS technologies, it can be shown that the economy slides into repressed
inflation (classical unemployment) when the share of traded goods in the
basket of consumers' goods, w, exceeds (is less than) the proportion of
traded goods in total production. Alternatively, countries with a non-oil
deficit (surplus) end up with repressed inflation (classical unemploy-
ment). Note that only short-run effects of an oil bonanza have been con-
sidered; in the long run wage and price adjustment ensure that repressed
inflation or classical unemployment disappear. In the long run one has an
increase in the relative price of non-traded goods, a decline of the
traded sector, and a boom of the non-traded sector. It may be a long and
painful process to achieve the new long-run equilibrium, hence in the
short run there may be a role for government policy.
For those countries that end up with repressed inflation, import
of labour may be a sensible policy. This shifts up the LME:XSNT' and
LME:XDNT loci and therefore reduces the required real appreciation of the
exchange rate. The intuition is that the extra workers employed in the
non-traded goods sector spent only part of their total expenditure on non-
traded goods. Hence, the excess demand for non-traded goods and the asso-
ciated inflation will be less. For those countries that end up with clas-
sical unemployment, wage subsidies to the traded goods sector may be a
sensible policy. If wT - wN~e is pegged at the pre-oil level, no workers
are fired in the traded goods sector and classical unemployment is ruled
out. Since the real appreciation now only works on the demand side and no
resources are shifted from the traded goods sector, the real appreciation
has to be larger. A more effective policy is to cut the wedge between the
real consumers' and real producers' wage (for example, with a cut in the
indirect tax rate), since this cuts labour costs across the board.24
4. Constraint expectations in dynamic economies
4.1. Mícro foundations of a tvo-period macroeconomic model
Another interesting extension of the static Barro-Grossman-
Malinvaud analysis of rationing in a closed economy (see Section 2) is to
allow for intertemporal considerations. This shows the role of expecta-
tions, which is crucial in Keynesian theory. The simplest theory is based
on the two-period model developed by Neary and Stiglitz (1983). This
allows one to consider intertemporal spill-over effects, that is expecta-
tions of future quantity constraints will affect the current regime. In
particular, it can be shown that, when agents expect unemployment tomor-
row, it will be more likely that there is unemployment today. So pessimis-
tic expectations can lead to bad outcomes today (cf., Persson and
Svensson, 1983); such phenomena are referred to as "boot-strap" effects.
When expectations about future quatity constraints are rational, it can be
shown that this increases the Keynesian employment multiplier: the f~scal
expansion today also raises national income, aggregate demand and the
demand for labour tomorrow and therefore current savings falls and current
aggregate demand rises more than it would do otherwise.
Let us start with a brief description of a simplified version of
the model developed by Neary and Stiglitz (1983). Households have an in-
elastic supply of labour, ~- Z, and decide on their life-time consumption
plan on the basis of subjective point expectations about future wages,
prices and constraint levels. To keep matters simple, only the first two
periods are concerned. Hence, households maximize their utility function,
saY U(cl.c2.m2) '~llog(cl) i oc2log(c2) ~ oc3log(m2), ~i 2 0, al.oc2.a3 - 1
where ci denotes consumption of goods in period i and m2 ~ M2~P2 denotes
real money holdings at the end of the second period, subject to their
intertemporal buàget constraint, Plcl ~ P2c2 t M2 s Y E M~ t Plsl t P2s2
where Y denotes total income, MQ denotes the households' initial endowment
of money balances and si denotes the households' real income in period i.
The indirect utility from consumption beyond the first two periods is
captured by the fact that m2 enters U(.); obviously, U(.) also depend on
exogeneous expectations of prices, wages and constraint levels in periods
beyond the first two. Note Lhat in contrast to Section 2, profits arez5
assumed to be distributed instanteneously. The maximization yields the
notional demand functions for current and future consumption:
~ .
ca - Ca(P1.p2.Y) - alY,Pl
c2 - C2(P1.P2.Y) - ~2Y~p2
(28)
(29)
where Ca is homogeneous of degree zero in its arguments. Consumption in
each period is a normal good and thus responds negatively to the price
prevailing in that period. If the substitution (income) effect dominates,
consumption today depends positively (negatively) on the price tomorrow.
For Cobb-Douglas preferences, the income and substitution effects exactly
cancel out. The notional demand for money is clearly given by md -
2
MZ(P1.p2.Y) - ~3Y~P2.
Firms maximize discounted profits,
n- P1fÍ~1) - W1~1 . p2f(i2) - W2~CZ.
which leads to the notional labour demand functions,
.
~i - Ld(wi). Ld - l~f „~ C i- 1 2
(30)
where wi ~ Wi~Pi denotes the real wage in period i, and notional output
supply functions,
si - f(~d(wi)) ~ Ss(wi), Ss - f'Ld ~ 0, i- 1,2. (31)
Note that we have ignored the role of inventories.
The government can purchase goods in each period, gi, and can make
transfer payments to households, thereby increasing their initial endow-
ment, M~, and finances these policy actions by printing money.26
4.2. Notional and effective equilibria with Walrasian expectations
Consider first the case where agents do not expect to be con-
strained, either today or tomorrow. This leads to the notional GMEi locus
of period i,
Ss(wi) - Ca(P1,P2,M~tPlf(Z)tP2f(z) { gi,




To reduce the dimensionality of the economy, assume that P1 and W2 remain
always at their Walrasian levels and concentrate on variations in wl and
P2 only. Hence, concentrate on the two first-period loci only (see Figvre
6). The LME1 locus is horizontal with points above (below) it correspond-
ing to excess supply of (demand for) labour. The GME1 locus is downward-
sloping, because an increase in today's real wage reduces aggregate supply
and a reduction in tomorrow's price level reduces total income and there-
fore reduces aggregate demand. (If the substitution effect dominates,
aggregate demand falls even further.) Points above (below) the GME1 locus
correspond to excess demand for (supply of) goods.
Now consider the case where agents expect Walrasian equilibrium to
prevail tomorrow yet allow for the possibility of quantity constraints
today. This leads to the same type of spill-over effects discussed in
Section 2. When there is unemployment today, households' effective demand
for goods will be less than their notional demand and therefore to main-
tain goods market equilibrium today's real wage has to rise. This is the
reason why the GMEI:XSL1 Iocus,
Sslwl) - Ca(P1.P2,KG,Plf(Ld(wl))~P2f(Z)) ~ B1. (34)
is steeper than the GME1 locus (see Figure 6). When there is an excess
demand for labour today, the GMEI:XDL1 locus is given by
f(Z) ' Ca(P1~P2~Mp'Plf(Z)tP2f(Z)) t B1 (35)and is therefore vertical. Firms are constrained in their hiring of labour
and therefore their effective supply of goods is less than their notional
supply. It follows that tomorrow's price level has to fall in order to
ensure goods narket equilibrium today. If there is an excess supply of
goods today, firms' demand for labour is constrained by the demand for
goods and therefore the LMEI:XSG1 locus coincides with the GMEI:XDL1
locus. This obviously rules out the regime of underconsumption, which is
due to the fact that there are no inventories. Obviously, the LMEI:XDG1
locus coincides with the LME1 locus as the supply of labour is inelastic.
The resulting effective GME1 and LME1 loci divide the space up in to three
regimes, i.e., Keynesian unemployment, classical unemployment and repres-
sed inflation (see Figure 6), so that as long as expectations about the
future are Walrasian the analysis is analogous to the standard Barro-
Grossman-Malinvaud analysis.
4.3. Intertemporal spill-over and "boot-strap" effects
Now consider intertemporal spill-over effects, that is the effects
of expectations of future quantity constraints on current behaviour of
households and firms. One of the objectives of Neary and Stiglitz (1983)
was to demonstrate the existence of "boot-strap" phenomena; when house-
holds expect to be unemployed today, and when firms expect they cannot
sell all their goods tomorrow, it is also more likely that firms will be
unable to sell all their goods today. Such phenomena leads to the possi-
bility of multiple equilibria for a given level of current and expected
future wages and prices. For ease of exposition, we concentrate on the
effects of expected Keynesian unemployment or classical unemployment
Since the supply of labour is inelastic, the effective LME1 locus
coincides with the notional LME1 locus as long as firms face no quantity
constraints in the current period. When households expect to be con-
strained in their sale of labour tomorrow, their human wealth declines and
therefore current consumption falls. It follows that the GMEI:XSL2 locus,
Ss(wl) - ~a(P1.P2,Mp,Plf(z)'P2f(Ld(W2~P2))) t gl. (36)28
lies to right of the notional GME1 locus, so that a higher current real
wage chokes off supply to the lower level of demand. (Obviously, the
GMEI:XDL2 locus coincides with the GME1 locus but we are not interested in
this locus anyway.) When firms expect to be unable to sell all their goods
tomorrow, thís does not affect the current effective supply of goods as we
abstract from the intertemporal spill-over effects arising from (reduced)
inventoríes. This means that the GMEI:KU2 (or GMEI:XSL2,XSG2) locus coín-
cides with the GMEI:XSL2 locus. However, if households expect that tomor-
row there will be an excess demand for goods as well as en excess supply
of labour (expect classical unemployment). then there is less incentive
for households to save (as they casuiot buy all the goods they want tomor-
row anyway) and therefore current consumption increases. This means that
the current real wage has to fall in order to boost supply, which shifts
the GMEI:CU2 locus,
Ss(wl) - ~(P1.P2.MG,Plf(z)~P2f(Ld(W2~P2)).c2) t B1 (37)
where C(.) denotes the demand-for-current-consumption function when
tomorrow's demand for goods is constrained to c2, to the left and thereby
expands the region of current excess demand for output. The GMEI:CU2 locus





say for P2 ( P2(c2) where P2(.) denotes the threshold level for P2. For
PZ ~ PZ(.) the GMEI:CU2 locus coincides with the GMEI:XSL2 locus. Since
future consum}tion is constrained, P~(.) lies to the right of the Walra-
sian leve], P2. The above results are illustrated in Figure 7.
So far, we have looked at the notional first-period loci when
there are expectations of future quantity constraints. Now consider the
effective loci when there are expectations of either Keynesian unemploy-
ment or classical unemployment (also, see Figure 7). The effective
GMEI:XSLI,KU2 locus is given by
Ss(wl) - Ca(P1.P2,M~.Plf(Ld(wl)'P2f(Ld(W2~P2))) 4 B1 (39)29
whilst the effective GMEI:XSLI,CU2 locus is given by
Ss(wl) - ~(P1.P2,MG'Pif(Ld(wl))tP2f(Ld(W2~P2)).c2) ~ gl. (40)
These two loci are only relevant above the LME1 locus, that is when there
is unemployment today. Obviously, they pivot to the right as current un-
employment means that today's demand for goods will be less and therefore
the supply of goods needs to be choked off with a higher real wage in
order to maintain goods market equilibrium in the first period. Clearly,
the GMEI:XLI,KU2 locus lies completely to the right of the GMEI:XLI,CU2
locus. It is now possible to divide the wl-P1 space bordered by the LME1,
GMEI:XSLI,CU2 and GMEI:XSLI,KU2 loci into combinations of current and
expected future regimes (see Figure 7). The shaded region is the most
interesting one; it consists of either (KU1,KU2) or (CU1,CU2).
The first point to notice is that the vector of current and expec-
ted future wages and prices consistent with Walrasian equilibrium is not
uni ue ~ H q (any P2 in between P2 and P2, for example), since it depends on the
nature of expectations about future quantity constraints. The second point
to notice is the non-uniqueness of effective equilibria for particular
constellations of current and expected future wages and prices; the shaded
region of Figure ~ is compatible with either Keynesian or classical unem-
ployment today, depending on what agents expect tomorrow. The final point
to notice is the "boot-strap" effect, that is Keynesian (classical) unem-
ployment is more likely to occur today when it is expected to prevail
tomorrow.
Of course, it is possible to extend the analysis in order to allow
for the effects of different constraint expectations.
4.4. Rational constraint expectations
The previous section employed arbitrary expectations about future
quantity constraints, which is undoubtedly the main reason for the non-
uniqueness of the Walrasian and effective equilibria. In order to avoid
this problem, one might borrow the assumption of rational expectations
from the New Classical School of Macroecomics. Although the assumption of
rational expectations may be within the spirit of market clearing and30
other assumptions of the New Classical School, it is a rather far-fetched
assumption withín a macrceconomic model with rationing. The assumption of
rational constraint expectations presumes that agents have an enormous
aaount of information in order to be able to calculate the aggregate
future quantity constraints in a rational fashion. However, it dces not
require knowledge of individual demands and supplies. This is just as
well, since if this were the case firms and households could engage in
bilateral bargaining which contradicts the fundamental assumption of fixed
wages and prices. Due to the difficulties in the coordination of the beha-
viour of individual households and firms when information (at a disaggre-
gated level) is imperfect, the assumption of rational constraint expecta-
tions may be a first step in removing the arbitrariness of expectations.
To understand rational constraint expectations, let us focus on
the case where there is unemployment today and Keynesian unemployment is
expected tomorrow. It is important at this stage to distinguish between
real and nominal wage rigidity. If there is real wage rigidíty (w2 con-
stant), then the GMEI:XSLI,KU2 locus is also the locus that pertains under
rational constraint expectations. However, if there is nominal wage rigi-
dity (i.e., W2 constant), one has to take account of the fact that second-
period income, 52 - f(Ld(W2~P2)), is an increasing function of the second-
period price, since a higher price erodes the real wage and this boosts
labour demand, employment and income. This means that the locus under
rational constraint expectations, say the RCE locus, lies to the right of
the GMEI:XSL1 locus. (Neary and Stiglitz (1983) discuss an iterative pro-
cedure to obtain consistency of expectations and of actuel outcomes, which
demonstrates that this remains the case even when there are intertemporal
spill-over effects arising from inventories.)
The main implication of the above argument is that the set of wl-
P2 combinations consistent with Keynesian rather than classical unemploy-
ment today is greater when Keynesian unemployment rather than when Walra-
sian equilibrium is expected to prevail tomorrow, so that rational con-
straint expectatíons increases the likelihood of Keynesian unemployment
to3ay. Hence, the "boot-strap" property still holds when constraint expec-
tations are rational. The assumption of rational constraint expectations
also reduces the non-uniqueness of the set of equilibria.31
Neary and Stiglitz (1983) also show that, under the assumption of
rational constraint expectations, the effects of an increase in government
spending on employment and output during a Keynesian regime today is
greater than under static expectations of Keynesian unemployment tomorrow
and greater still than under Walrasian expectations about the future. The
main reason for this interesting result is that an increase in government
spending is more effective when firms are pessimistic about their future
sales prospects. Also, the increase in government spending relaxes the
constraint on current sales and therefore firms might plan to hire more
labour and produce more output tomorrow. Under the assumption of rational
constraint expectations, households realize that this increases their
life-cycle income and therefore increase consumption both today and tomor-
row which in turn increases the effective demand for labour today.
Note the sharp contrast with the policy neutrality results of the
New Classical School. Their neutrality results depend on price flexibílity
(market clearing) and rational expectations. Rational expectations actual-
ly enhance the effectiveness of fiscal policy in the rationing approach.
Hence, it follows that the essential ingredient of the policy neutrality
propositions of the New Classical School is market clearing rather than
rational expectations. In this sense, the great debates about the effec-
tiveness of aggregate demand management that took place in the recession
of the thirties seem to be repeated forty to fifty years later with the
"icing on the cake" being rational expectations.32
5. Concluding remarks
This paper presented a survey of rationing in simple macroeconomic
modeZs. It started off with rationing in a closed economy. The main point
was to distinguish between effective and notional demands and supplies,
where the former takes account of the spill-over effects of rationing in
other markets. For example, a household who cannot sell all the labour it
wants, will consume less. Because allowance was made for the buffer role
of real money balances and inventories, the four regimes of Keynesian
unemployment, classical unemployment, underconsumption and repressed in-
flation could be distinguished. The effectiveness of fiscal and monetary
policy in each of these four regimes was analyzed. Neither policy has any
effect when there is classical unemployment. A fiscal or monetary expan-
sion increases employment and output when there is Keynesian unemployment
(or underconsumption), but decreases employment and output when there is
repressed inflation. There was also a discussion of wage price dynamics.
The paper continued with a consideration of rationing in a one-
sector small open economy. There cannot be any disequilibrium in the goods
market, because any excess demand for (supply of) goods is eliminated by
importing from (exporting to) the rest of the world. The result is a
"Mundell-Swan" diagram with four regimes: unemployment and trade deficit
or trade surplus and excess demand for labour and trade deficit or sur-
plus. A two-sector small open economy, with a traded ("exposed") goods
sector and a non-traded ("sheltered") goods sector was considered next.
The traded goods market always clears, because any excess demand or supply
can be met from abroad. It follows that the four regimes of Keynesian
unemployment, classical unemployment, repressed inflation and undercon-
sumption reappear (even if there are no inventories). It was assumed that
the relative price of non-traded goods rises when there is an excess de-
mand for non-traded goods and that the real consumers' wage declines when
there is unemployment. The effects of an oil bonanze in such a two-sector
economy depends on the share of imported goods in the consumers' basket.
When this share is large the economy slides into a regime of repressed
inflation and when it is small the economy end up in a regime of classical
unemployment. The former case coresponds to the Gulf countries and the
latter case corresponds to the Latin American countries.33
The survey ended up with a discussion of rationing in dynamic,
closed economies. In such a setting the effects of expectations about
future constraints on current regimes need to be considered. What one
finds is that households' (firms') expectations of future constraints on
their ability to sell labour (goods) make it more likely that they face a
sales constraint in the current period. This phenomenon is referred to as
"boot-strap" equilibria. When one allows for rational constraint expecta-
tions in a current regime of Keynesian unemployment, one finds that the
employment multiplier of government spending is greater with rational than
with static expectations of Keynesian unemployment. Hence, one finds that
in a disequilibrium setting rational expectations can reinforce the Keyne-
sian multiplier.
No survey is complete without giving an indication of what the
promising areas for further research are. At least three areas can be pin-
pointed. The first area is to use existing macroeconomic models with ra-
tioning for policy purposes. These models are ideally suited for such
tasks, because the micro foundations mean that a proper welfare analysis
is feasible. To do this in a convenient way requires the use of duality
(revenue and expenditure functions), because then the effects of policy
changes on utility levels can immediately be deduced (e.g., Dixit and
Norman, 1980; but also see Neary and Roberts, 198o for the use of "virtual
prices" in duality analysis). Good examples of such policy exercises are
van Wijnbergen (i984, 1985) on the effects of an oil bonanza and the
"Dutch Disease" and Rankin (1987a) on the welfare-maximizing levels of
government spending, taxation and debt in a dynamic, closed economy with
rationing. The two-country model with rationing developed in Rankin
(1987b) can fruitfully be applied to analyse the merits of international
policy coordination, especielly when one assumes nominal wage rigidity in
the U.S. and real wage rigidity in Europe. This might provide an explana-
tion of why, in the absence of international policy coordination, fiscal
policy is too loose in the U.S. and too tight in Europe. The second area
for further research is to relax the assumption of price and wage sticky-
ness or, alternatively, to explain why these rigidities occur (see Drazen,
1980). an interesting example of this is Gale (1983), who developes a
competitive model that operates not too differently from a fix-price ra-
tioning model. Gale's competitive model has Keynesian features, because ítallows firms to be liquidity constrained when prices are unexpectedly low.
Hart (1982) and Bénassy (1986) give alternative explanations based on
monopolistic co~apetition. A related problem is that future research should
explain unemployment rather than underemployment (cf., Lucas, 1987). A lOX
reduction in working hours (increase in leisure) for 100X of the labour
force is what might happen in rationing models, but is quite different
from a 100X reduction in workers hours for lOX of the labour force and
therefore requires a very different policy response. In other words,
future work should model unemployment as an activity and oodel the speci-
fic relationship between the individuel worker and firm. Useful steps in
this direction have already been made by the theory on search and job
matching (see the survey in Lucas, 1987). The third area for further re-
search is to develop end use econometric methods to test macroeconomic
models of rationing. F~uidamental empirical work on (non-linear simulta-
neous, dynamic and trade) rationing models of the Dutch economy has been
reported in Siebrand (1979). Rigorous estimation procedures are discussed
in Sneessens (1981), Kooiman and Kloek (1982) and Kooiman (1984) whilst a
more eclectic approach is used to estimate a rationing model of the Bel-
gian economy in Sneessens and Drèze (1986).35
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Figure 2: Effective GME and LME loci and the four regimes
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Figure 3: Rationing in a one-sector model of a small open economy
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